Separation of body and soul in Plato’s Phaedo : an unprecedented ontological operation in the affinity argument by Cornelli, Gabriele
Autorização concedida ao Repositório Insttucional da Universidade de Brasília (RIUnB) pelo 
Professor Gabriele Cornelli, em 05 de agosto de 2019, para disponibilizar o trabalho, 
gratuitamente, para fns de leitura, impressão e/ou download, a ttulo de divulgação da obra, a 
partr desta data. A obra contnua protegida por eireito Autoral e/ou por outras leis aplicáveis. 
Qualquer uso da obra que não o autorizado sob esta licença ou pela legislação autoral é proibido.
REFERÊNCIA
CORNELLI, Gabriele. Separaton of body and soul in Plato's Phaedo: an unprecedented ontological 
operaton in the afnity argument. In: PITTELOUe, Luca; KEELING, Evan. (ed.). Psychology and 












Luciano Floridi, University of Oxford, Oxford Internet Institute, UK
Mariarosaria Taddeo, University of Oxford, Oxford Internet Institute, UK
Executive Editorial Board
Patrick Allo, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Massimo Durante, Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy
Phyllis Illari, University College London, United Kingdom
Shannon Vallor, Santa Clara University
Board of Consulting Editors
Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe
Radu Bogdan, Tulane University
Marian David, University of Notre Dame
John M. Fischer, University of California at Riverside
Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson
Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University
François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris
Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas at Austin
Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo
Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College
Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6459
Luca Pitteloud • Evan Keeling
Editors
Psychology and Ontology 
in Plato
ISSN 0921-8599     ISSN 2542-8349 (electronic)
Philosophical Studies Series
ISBN 978-3-030-04653-8    ISBN 978-3-030-04654-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04654-5
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018967218
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of 
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, 
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information 
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology 
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication 
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant 
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book 
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the 
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors 
or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims 
in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Editors
Luca Pitteloud
Center for Natural and Human Sciences 
(CCNH)
Universidade Federal do ABC
São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
Evan Keeling
Department of Philosophy
University of Sao Paulo
São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
vContents
 1  Imagination for Philosophical Exercise in Plato’s Republic:  
The Story of Gyges’ Ring and the Simile of the Sun  . . . . . . . . . . . . .    1
Noburu Notomi
 2  Dionysian Plato in the Symposium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   15
Fernando Santoro
 3  Separation of Body and Soul in Plato’s Phaedo: An Unprecedented 
Ontological Operation in the Affinity Argument  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   23
Gabriele Cornelli
 4  Plato and the “Internal Dialogue”: An Ancient Answer  
for a New Model of the Self  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   33
Alexandru-Ovidiu Gacea
 5  Pathos in the Theaetetus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   55
Evan Keeling
 6  The Analogy Between Vice and Disease  
from the Republic to the Timaeus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   67
Olivier Renaut
 7  Why Is the World Soul Composed of Being, Sameness  
and Difference?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   85
Luca Pitteloud
 8  Can One Speak of Teleology In Plato?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  109
Luc Brisson
 9  Nomos: Logismós ton Epithymion. Plato’s Laws  
and the (De)formation of Desires  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  125
Juliano Paccos Caram
 Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  139
vii
This volume consists of a selection of papers presented at an international confer-
ence on Plato, which occurred at the Federal University of ABC, Brazil, in 2016. 
Present at the event were a number of scholars of international repute, along with a 
number of younger scholars, from Brazil and the rest of the world. The aim of the 
conference was to increase international dialogue and to discuss new approaches to 
Plato’s philosophy, especially in the burgeoning fields of Platonic ontology and psy-
chology. The selections in this volume include only works which discuss Plato’s 
middle and late periods, periods which are increasingly studied both as precursors 
to Aristotelian philosophy and as having philosophical interest in their own right. 
Despite this cohesion of period, the papers themselves come from a wide variety of 
approaches and provide a good sense of the current state of Platonic scholarship 
worldwide.
The papers published in this volume focus on Plato’s Republic (Notomi, Renaut), 
Symposium (Santoro), Phaedo (Cornelli), Theaetetus (Keeling, Gacea), Sophist 
(Gacea), Timaeus (Brisson, Renaut, Pitteloud), and Laws (Caram). Some are con-
cerned more with psychology than with ontology or vice versa, but all of them deal 
in some way with both areas.
 1. We begin with the Republic. In “Imagination for Philosophical Exercise in 
Plato’s Republic: The Story of Gyges’ Ring and the Simile of the Sun,” Noburu 
Notomi discusses two of the Republic’s most famous images. In Republic X, 
Plato notoriously casts a harsh light upon the practice of image-making, placing 
it in in the third place in the ontological and epistemological hierarchies, with the 
Forms at the highest rung. Many commentators thereby conclude that his atti-
tude toward images and image-making is unremittingly negative. Yet, Plato him-
self frequently uses images to convey his views, including (quite famously) in 
the Republic. Notomi attempts to resuscitate the tarnished image of images. He 
argues that images can represent reality in special ways for Plato and that imagi-
nation is an effective method of inquiry to reveal a reality heretofore unknown to 
us. To illustrate the epistemic utility of imagination, he first re-examines Plato’s 
famous image of Gyges’ Ring in Republic II, so as to demonstrate that Plato 
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ascribes to images a special role of transforming our souls. He then turns to ana-
lyze the role of imagination in the Simile of the Sun in Book VI.
 2. We will return later to the Republic. But first, Fernando Santoro (“Dionysian 
Plato in the Symposium”) puts us in a Bacchaean mood while leading us through 
the Symposium. The personalities in this dialogue are, he argues, representations 
of literary types. The Symposium’s characters wear different masks, each repre-
senting a different wisdom tradition. The dialogue celebrates not just Eros and 
Aphrodite but also Dionysus (177e), who (argues Santoro) can be found lurking 
beneath three masks worn in the Symposium. First, Aristophanes’ speech por-
trays a cosmogony based on a theogony with an Orphic inspiration. Second, 
Diotima’s speech, under the dialectic and ascetic mask of philosophy, intends to 
initiate us into the mysteries. The rite’s second step makes the jump from the 
particular to the universal. Finally, the confessional discourse of Alcibiades, in 
which he unmasks both himself and Socrates, is an epoptic revelation for initi-
ates or else the desecration of a mystery. The third stage reveals a deep truth that 
is only revealed when one is taken by the madness or drunkenness of love.
 3. We turn next to the Phaedo, in Gabriele Cornelli’s “Separation of Body and 
Soul in Plato’s Phaedo: An Unprecedented Ontological Operation in the Affinity 
Argument.” The topic here is the distinction between body and soul. Cornelli 
argues that in fact two different construals of this separation are at work in the 
dialogue. There is, first, a moral separation, regarding what a philosopher should 
take care of: philosophers ought to mind the soul and not the body. A second 
separation is more ontological: the soul is so independent from the body that is 
declared to survive after its death. Although both concepts of this separation are 
familiar, due to the success they had throughout the history of Platonism until 
today, the duplicity of meanings expressed in the Phaedo leads to an irrevocable 
ambiguity. This ambiguity has usually been resolved by admitting that the moral 
dualism would be just a kind of anticipated death of the body, as conditio sine 
qua non for the full and successful practice of philosophy. What Cornelli sug-
gests, however, is a quite different solution to the ambiguity. Contrary to the 
Forms, the soul can take on sensible features, and for this reason one must care 
for one’s soul above the body. This gives rise to the dialogue’s ethical aspects. 
Here it is the moral separation of body and soul, rather than any ontological 
assumption, that ends up guiding the moral and epistemological consequences of 
the dialogue. These consequences require a continual epistemological and moral 
effort of the soul.
 4. For the second part of the volume, we turn to Plato’s late period. Alexandru 
Ovidiu Gacea, in “Plato and the ‘Internal Dialogue’,” discusses that famous 
Platonic idea, found both in the Theaetetus and the Sophist, that thinking is a 
dialogue one has with oneself. Against some trends in the understanding of this 
idea, Gacea suggests that its “internal” aspect is best construed in physical 
terms. The idea that thinking is a dialogue is understood in terms of a number 
of distinguishable “voices” which form a microcommunity. We thereby learn 
that thinking is a physical process associated with breathing and that it consists 
of a “coming together” of multiple “voices.” “Inner dialogue,” he argues, is 
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 mirrored in the overall structure of Plato’s works, and it represents the very way 
philosophical debate ought to be conducted, i.e., as an open-ended search for 
knowledge, one that never concludes with a definite, unified perspective on 
reality but that searches into to bring the plurality of “voices” into a responsive 
relationship.
 5. Staying in the Theaetetus and continuing on a similar theme, Evan Keeling, in 
“Pathos in the Theaetetus,” raises a challenge to the widely accepted view that 
subjective knowledge did not make its appearance until Augustine and that ideal-
ism was only made possible by Descartes. The theory of perception associated 
with Protagoras in the Theaetetus includes the view that one’s pathē constitute 
truth and knowledge. As pathos usually means “experience,” as it does in later 
Greek epistemology and psychology, this would seem to indicate that Protagoras 
or someone in his circle held that there is subjective knowledge: knowledge of 
our own experiences. Keeling argues that this is an illusion: in these passages, 
pathos denotes the quality of an external physical object, not an internal 
experience.
 6. In “The Analogy Between Vice and Disease from the Republic to the Timaeus,” 
Olivier Renaut analyzes Plato’s famous analogy between health and virtue and 
vice and disease, with this paper focusing on the latter pair. He begins with the 
Republic before exploring this issue in the Timaeus as well. What is a strict anal-
ogy in the Republic seems to refer to a causal interaction between body and soul 
in the Timaeus: vice can emerge from a malign disposition of the body, and 
conversely, vice can cause or feed new bodily diseases in a disharmonious and 
neglected body. Renaut argues that, even so, there is a consistent use of the anal-
ogy between vice and disease in the Republic and the Timaeus. The fact that we 
tend not to blame people for their bodily diseases plus the claim that psychic 
diseases are involuntary in the Timaeus might seem to undermine the idea that 
we are morally responsible for them. Renaut argues, however, that the Republic 
and Timaeus account is compatible with the agent’s responsibility regarding his 
ethical and physical good condition, within a strong normative approach of dis-
eases, both from the body and the soul.
 7. Next, Luca Pitteloud turns us full force to the Timaeus in his “Why is the World 
Soul composed by  Being, Sameness and Difference?” Pitteloud discusses a 
number of vexed issues involving the Demiurge, the Receptacle, and especially 
the World Soul, trying to determine the relationship between the nature of the 
World Soul in the Timaeus and its functionality. The paper discusses the follow-
ing dimensions of the World Soul: (a) its composition, (b) its mathematical struc-
ture, (c) its moving function, and (d) its cognitive function. Pitteloud reads the 
World Soul’s ontological constitution as articulated within the framework of the 
teleological dimension of the discourse, showing that it is the two functions of 
the Word Soul (moving and cognitive) that justify why it possesses the structure 
of an intermediate mixture constituted from being, sameness, and difference. As 
such, it is the proper causality (aitia), which is exemplified by the Demiurge’s 
teleological deduction in Timaeus’ discourse, that determines the auxiliary cau-
sality (sunaitia), namely, the structure of the World Soul.
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x 8. With Luc Brisson’s “Can One Speak of Teleology in Plato?,” we continue our 
exploration of the Timaeus. Apropos of Pitteloud’s discussion of teleology, 
Brisson asks if we ought to take there to be teleology in the Timaeus and how it 
should be understood. To answer this question, the Demiurge’s reasoning (the 
way he wishes to fashion the best possible world) must be related to the way the 
universe is ordered. As we find also in Aristotle, there is a psychological descrip-
tion of the function of the first Unmoved Mover (object of desire) in order to 
explain, the world, in Plato, the teleology appears within the Demiurge’s nous.
 9. We conclude with the Laws and the end of Plato’s own philosophical career. In 
“Nomos: logismós ton epithymion. Laws VI and VII and the (de)formation of 
Desires,” Juliano Paccos Caram investigates how a city’s laws and educational 
structure influence the desires and the virtue of its citizens. The focus will be on 
how correct education and laws influence the desires of the citizenry, with an eye 
toward the role of the formation and distortion of desires in the moral education 
of young politicians.
We hope this volume will be helpful both to new and advanced scholars of Plato’s 
philosophy, those who wish to examine Plato’s psychology and ontology and all 
their richness and complexity. These are fruitful areas to explore, and any insights 
Plato had to share with us deserve to reach a wider audience.
Center for Natural and Human Sciences (CCNH) Luca Pitteloud
Universidade Federal do ABC
São Paulo, Brazil
Department of Philosophy Evan Keeling
University of Sao Paulo
São Paulo, Brazil
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This paper aims to address the problem of the separation of body and soul in Plato’s 
Phaedo, in search of both its ontological features and moral consequences. Apart 
from the normal approach and use of dialogue as a literary and philosophical mile-
stone for all body-soul dualisms of the history of philosophy, I believe two different 
ways of understanding this separation are outlined in the dialogue. The first one 
would indicate a moral separation, regarding what a philosopher should take care 
of: philosophers are supposed to mind the soul and not the body.1
There are several pages within the dialogue in which this thesis, widely taken up 
by tradition, is mentioned. It will be sufficient to mention the first page of dialogue 
where this issue is raised to give a glimpse of the moral extent of the idea of the 
separation of body and soul.
‘Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?’
‘Certainly,’ replied Simmias.
‘Can we believe that it is anything other than the separation of the soul from the 
body? And do we believe that being dead is the following: the body has been separated 
from the soul and come to be apart, alone by itself, and the soul has been separated 
from the body and is apart, alone by itself. Can death be anything other than that?’
‘No, that’s what it is,’ he said.
Consider then, my friend, if you too turn out to think what I do. I believe that the 
following points will give us a better understanding of the things we are looking 
into. Does it seem to you in character for a philosophical man to be eager for such 
so-called pleasures as those of food and drink?’
‘No, not at all, Socrates,’ said Simmias.
‘How about those of sex?’
‘By no means’.
1 On the standard version of the body-mind problem in the Phaedo, see Fierro (2013).
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‘What about the other sorts of attention given to the body? Do you think some-
one like that holds them in high regard? Take, for example, acquiring superior cloth-
ing and shoes and the other ways of adorning the body: do you think he values them, 
or attaches no value to them except in so far as he absolutely must take an interest 
in them?’
‘No value, I think,’ he said, ‘at least if he’s truly a philosopher’.
‘In short, then, do you think,’ he said, ‘that such a man’s concern is not for the 
body, and that, as far as he can, he stands apart from it and is turned towards his 
soul?’
‘Yes, I do’.
‘So first of all is it clear that in matters like these the philosopher releases his soul 
as much as possible from its association with the body, he above all other people?’
‘So it seems’.
‘And ordinary people think, don’t they, Simmias, that life isn’t worth living for 
someone who finds nothing of that kind pleasant, and who takes no interest in bodily 
things. They think that he who gives no thought to the pleasures which come via 
the body is pretty close to being dead’.
‘Yes, what you say is quite true’.
(Phd 64c-65a – Transl. Sedley&Long)
So, the first meaning of the separation, the moral one, regards a philosopher who 
gives no thought to the body and turns himself towards his soul. This separation, 
operated by those who particularly disdain the body and live in philosophy (Phd 
68c), is said being pretty close to being dead, because of course death is nothing 
other than this separation between body and soul.2
A second way to address this separation between body and soul is the one I 
would call an ontological separation: the soul is so independent from the body that 
is declared to survive after his death.
Again, it is worth remembering here one of the several pages dedicated to the 
proofs (and the myths) of the immortality of the soul. I’ll choose the final argument, 
not because the argument is regarded by Plato as conclusive (pace Frede 1978, 
p.  27) but because it seems to finally undermine the considerable criticism of 
Simmias and Cebes and to reach their consent:
‘So because the immortal is also indestructible, surely soul, if it really is immor-
tal, would also be imperishable, wouldn’t it?’
‘It absolutely must’.
‘In that case, when death attacks the human being, the mortal part of him dies, it 
seems, whereas the immortal part departs intact and undestroyed, and is gone, 
having retreated from death’.
2 Broadie (2001, p. 307) and Carone (2005, p. 245) rightly stressed the relevance of this ethical 
dualism in the Phaedo. Woolf (2004) proposes a further and very sharp distinction between a 
weaker, called evaluative dualism, and a stronger ascetic reading of the separation. For Pitteloud 
(2017, pp. 58–82), the separation between soul and body must be understood in the light of the 
separation between Forms and sensible objects. See also Pakaluk (2003) on the maximization of 
the death as core concern of a philosophical life: the philosopher aims to be as dead as possible 
while alive; hence, he welcomes the maximal condition of death, when it arrives (2003, p. 99).
G. Cornelli
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(Phd 106d-e - Transl. Sedley&Long)
Although both concepts of this separation could seem pretty familiar, due to the 
success they had throughout the history of Platonism until today, the duplicity of 
meanings expressed by the Platonic pages carries on an irrevocable ambiguity. This 
ambiguity has been usually resolved admitting that the moral dualism would be just 
a kind of anticipated homicide of the body, as condition sine qua non for a full and 
successful practice of philosophy.
This same lectio happens to be suggested by Socrates himself, while he’s taking 
the separation of the soul from the body as τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως, practice to 
die easily (Phd 81a1-2). We can see here a process of simple conformation of the 
philosopher to the inevitable ontological reality of this dualism.
The huge success of this moral conformation of the philosopher in the history of 
Western thought allows Dixsaut to rightly claim that:
[Le Phédon] est le texte entre tous que a permis la substitution du platonisme aux 
Dialogue, car l’on s’accorde à y trouver la formulation achevée de la théorie des 
Idées, et l’expression la plus radicale de l’ascétisme, voire même, avant la lettre, du 
christianisme de Platon. (Dixsaut 2001, p. 219)
But to what extent this ontological separation actually goes—I mean how strong 
should be regarded the body-soul dualism in Plato’s dialogues—is an endless unre-
solved debate. It’s not my aim here to offer an account of the ongoing discussion 
between the scholars who think that Plato is a strong dualist and the ones who think 
that his dualism should be taken with a grain of salt.3
My paper will simply assume two undemonstrated (but well-referenced) starting 
points: (a) Plato’s dualism is far from being a strong substance dualism, like the one 
we are used to after Descartes (Broadie, 2001); (b) Plato’s idea of an independent 
existence of the soul apart of the body, which would represent the strongest dualistic 
approach, is not a definitive, coherent theory one can find in Plato’s writings. Carone 
is right in claiming that Plato kept an open mind as to whether the soul is something 
immaterial or not, in a way that makes later historical transitions, such as the theo-
ries of Aristotle and the Stoics, far less abrupt that one may think (2005, 230).4
What I suggest here, therefore, is a quite different solution for the ambiguity 
between moral and ontological dualism. My suggestion is that we should pay the 
proper attention to the ontological and epistemological ductility of the soul. Bostock 
(1986, 119 @Phd. 79c) called it the chameleon-like traits of the soul, enabling the 
soul to assume bodily features to meet the sensible world.
The central page here is 79c and I’ll devote my paper more closely to it from now 
on. We can find the page inside what has been called the Argument from Affinity 
3 See Ostenfeld (1987), Frede (1999), Broadie (2001), Carone (2005), Fronterotta (2007), and 
Fierro (2013) for a wider account of the debate.
4 At the same time I distance myself from Carone (2005). She claims that Plato, in his later dia-
logues, would have left behind the strong dualistic commitments of the Phaedo by allowing that 
the mind may be the subject of spatial movements. I believe some kind of indecision and nuances 
on his dualistic approach can be seen right from the Phaedo itself, i.e. from at least the middle 
dialogues. See also Johannsen (2000) claiming that in the Timaeus, Plato is ascribing spatial prop-
erties to soul and body alike.
3 Separation of Body and Soul in Plato’s Phaedo: An Unprecedented…
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(Phd 77a-80b). The argument starts from the statement of a substantial difference 
between sensible and intelligible dimensions. This difference depends on the attri-
butes of mutability, identity/simplicity and consequently visibility. While the 
 sensible world, and the body within it, is non-identical to itself, hence changeable, 
on its side, intelligible reality, to which the soul is similar, is always identical to 
itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, 78d6), hence unchangeable. Reality in itself, which means 
the Forms (τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν 78d3-4), does not admit 
any possibility of μεταβολὴ, of change, while τά πολλά καλά (78d10), the plurality 
of the beautiful things (human beings, horses, clothes, etc.), will never be identical 
to themselves, or each one to the other.
At this point Socrates’ argument gives a step forward, introducing the issue of 
visibility:
Now isn’t it true that these you could touch, see and perceive with the other 
senses, but that when it comes to those that stay identical, you could never get hold 
of them with anything other than the reasoning of your thought, such things being 
unseen and not visible?
(Phd 79a 1-4 Transl. Sedley&Long, slightly modified)
In this case—Socrates’ reasoning is going further—we should very likely admit 
the existence of two different genres or classes (εἴδη) of things that are τὸ μὲν 
ὁρατόν and τὸ δὲ ἀιδέ, the visible and the invisible ones. Once Socrates leads the 
interlocutor to admit, starting from the simple existence of invisible things, that 
something like a genre (εἶδος) of the invisible actually exists, it’s easy for him to 
take the argument to the conclusion, playing a double checkmate to the interlocutor: 
(a) Socrates is now able to ascribe to the εἶδος of the invisible what had previously 
held (79a1-4) of the invisible things, which means what is invisible is unchangeable, 
always identical to itself; (b) he’s now in the position to claim that, of the two con-
stituent parts of the individual, the body is more akin (ὁμοιότερον) to the visible, 
while the soul is more akin to the invisible (79b15).5,6
It is noteworthy that this Argument from Affinity doesn’t generally enjoy much 
respect from the scholarship. According to Apolloni (1996, p. 5), the lack of sympa-
thy and enthusiasm for this argument is not difficult to understand. In fact—still 
quoting Apolloni:
The main thrust of this chain of arguments is clearly very weak. That the soul is 
more similar to the Forms than it is to bodies does not establish how it is similar. 
And so it falls short of showing that it is similar in that both the soul and the Forms 
are indestructible or indissoluble (…). If the conclusion leaves open the possibility 
5 Here it is important to note that the word εἶδος doesn’t have, in the passage under discussion, the 
technical meaning of idea/form. This connotation of the word is going to play an important role 
later on in the dialogue (see Phd 103e).
6 Fierro (2013, p. 21) rightly points out that the comparative ὁμοιότερον here (along with the super-
lative ὁμοιότατον @80b) reveals that the ontological difference between the soul and the body is 
more attenuated than the one between the intelligible and the sensible realms. Casertano (2015 
@79b) follows a similar line of thought: “this comparative leads, logically to (1) that the soul is not 
the invisible, but it is more invisible than the body; (2) that the body is also similar to the invisible, 
but less invisibile than the soul”.
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that the soul is nearly indestructible, then it is destructible after all, in which case the 
argument falls short of establishing what it was supposed to. (Apolloni, 1996, 
pp. 5–6)7
Elton (1997, p. 313) sees in the argument an object lesson in how not to do good 
philosophy. Dorter (1976, p. 298) roundly claims that the argument is clearly not 
intended to be a rigorous one.
A similar complaint has been filed by Trabattoni (2011). When Socrates says that 
the soul is akin to the invisible (because only the forms are really invisible), the 
argument is fatally undermined, claims Trabattoni. Only the invisible itself is 
unchangeable and indestructible, not something (like the soul) which is simply akin 
to it (Trabattoni, 2011, p. 107 n123).
Even Bostock (1986) considered the argument, built on these likenesses, some-
what shaky (Bostock, 1986, p. 119).
Actually this complaint is not new. We can find it filed in Porphyry’s Contra 
Boethus, for instance. The text is preserved in Eusebius of Caesarea’s Praeparatio 
Evangelica. Eusebius, immediately after quoting a generous passage of Socrates’s 
argument from affinity, refers to Porphyry’s explanation of the correct meaning of 
the passage (Eus. PE 9. 27.20.1). Eusebius’ polemic here is clearly directed against 
Boethus’ criticism of the weakness of the argument.8
However, this recurrent complaint of the scholarship regarding certain inconsis-
tency in the argument of the similarity of the soul with the ideas seems to disregard 
a central issue in the economy of the dialogue: the main frame of the dialogue as a 
whole is to persuade Simmias and Cebes to agree that the soul is immortal. Not 
surprisingly, this very same idea can be seen in the dramatic introduction to the 
argument from affinity itself: Socrates commits himself to undo the childish fear of 
the death of Cebes and Simmias, through an effort of persuasion and charm (Phd 
77d-e). This effort results in the argument under discussion. I hope I’ll be able to 
demonstrate that this Socratic persuasion should be seen as more than a dramatic 
strategy of Plato. I would like to be able to claim that a kind of inversion of the 
ontological logic could be at play here.
I suspect scholarship is generally expecting from Socrates the statement of an 
ontological dualism stronger than the one he is actually willing to admit. Many 
scholars have complained about the fact that the soul is not incorruptible, like the 
forms are. But the fact is that soul is not incorruptible. In my view, Socrates’ argu-
ment does not want to say that it is.
Indeed, even though Socrates’ argument seems to stress the common invisibility 
of the soul and forms, he does not even try to bring the two together when it comes 
to the immutability. While the forms are, by definition, unchanging, the soul, on the 
contrary, is permanently subject to change.
7 Apolloni (1996, p. 7) is rightly trying to recover the argument’s value, by taking it as a deductive 
proof and a philosophically more worthy of attention piece than, for example, the arguments of the 
reminiscence or the final argument.
8 Boetus’ criticism and text have been regrettably omitted by Eusebius. For a discussion of this 
omission, see Gertz (2011, pp. 126–29).
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Here is the passage:
Weren’t we also saying some time ago that whenever the soul uses the body for 
investigating something, whether through seeing or through hearing or through 
some other sense—for to investigate something through the body is to do so through 
the senses—it is dragged by the body into things that are never identical to them-
selves, and she walks around in confused state, staggering like drunk, being attached 
to realities like these? (Phd. 79c2-9).
The term ταράττεται (which we translated to be in a confused state) and the 
passage as a whole refer to a parallel discussion held a few pages before, more pre-
cisely at 66a5. Here the senses are perceived as a hindrance (ταράττοντος, 66a5), 
preventing the embodied soul to reach the truth (see Rowe, 1993, p. 186). Similarly, 
in the passage we translate above, this process is described by Socrates mainly to 
warn of the dangers of perversion of the soul when it wants to use the body to inves-
tigate the sensible world.9 We are going to call this process somatization of the soul, 
since the term σωμᾰτοειδής is referred twice in this passage (Phd 81b6 and 81c4).
Something in this description of the somatization of the soul grants an unprece-
dented ontological possibility. Surprisingly enough, the soul, unlike the forms, 
which are invincibly immaterial, may even take bodily traits.
This vivid portrait of the soul, which, staggering like drunk (ὥσπερ μεθύουσα), 
is dragged by the body and walks around in confused state (Phd 79c), seems to want 
to reveal something more precise than the usual concept of the soul being attached 
to the body.
Two things are noteworthy here:
 (a) The first, as already announced, is that the soul seems to take bodily traits. The 
poisoning of the soul (said to be drunk) seems to suggest that. This picture is 
substantially different from the one of a simple imprisonment of the soul inside 
a bodily shell. The latter case, in fact, would not imply any kind of 
contamination.
 (b) The process of incarnation of the soul into the body does not appear to be the 
result of a passive entrapment of the soul by the body. On the contrary, what 
apparently is going on here is the soul moving towards the body and wanting to 
make use of it in order to know the world through the senses (the term used here 
is, of course, αἴσθησις, significantly repeated twice @ 79c4-5).10
9 Another image, quite expressive, of the inevitability of this somatization is the one of the souls 
wandering as ghosts by the tombs (Phd 81d). See Gertz (2011, p. 29) on the reading of this very 
passage by Ammonium.
10 Both the ideas of the palingenesis, which is a core point in the first argument for the immortality 
in the Phaedo (70c-72e), and the anamnesis, the second argument (72e-77a), also imply a kind of 
inclination of the soul towards the coupling with the body (in the first argument) and a positive 
function of the senses since knowledge is the result from an interaction between the information 
that our senses give us and universal notions, under which we classify our sense data (see Fierro, 
2013, p. 24, and Scott, 1987, p. 348).
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Bostock (1986), as we mentioned, in his commentary on the dialogue saw in the 
soul, depicted as it is here, chameleon-like characters, allowing it to take bodily 
traits in order to grasp the sensible world:
This assigns the soul a chameleon-like character—it simply takes on the nature 
of whatever it is thinking of—and is not much of a ground for saying that it is more 
like what is unchanging than what is changeable. (Bostock, 1986, p. 119)
The soul, therefore, can turn, and, more than that, she wants to transform itself in 
order to feel the world through the body.
Facing this sort of ontology of the incarnation outlined above, therefore, the pos-
sibility of an unprecedented meaning for the psychophysical dualism insinuates 
itself surreptitiously within the Platonic pages.
The vocabulary of the somatization of the soul, to confine ourselves exclusively 
to these arguments from affinity pages, includes terms like κοινωνέω (80e4), σύνειμι 
(81b3 e 81c5), and ὁμιλία (81c5), as well as the aforementioned adjective 
σωματοειδής (81b6 e 81c4), in addition, of course, to the very term συγγένεια 
(79d3), which traditionally names the argument as a whole.
But a correct understanding of the meaning of this dualism will probably depend 
on how we would translate a central term for Socrates’ argument. The aforemen-
tioned modalities of somatization of the soul are possible—Socrates says—due to 
the fact that the soul is σύμφυτον with the body (Phd 81c6).
Here is the full passage:
Instead, I suppose, [the soul] will be intermingled with the corporeal, which the 
body’s company and coupling, because of their constant coupling and because of its 
long practice, have made grown together. (Phd. 81c4-7—Transl. Sedley&Long with 
some modifications)
I here adopt Rowe’s translation of the term σύμφυτον as made grown together in 
[the soul], pointing here to a botanical metaphor (Rowe, 1993, p. 193). I do that, 
however, with a slight but quite significant correction: while Rowe is thinking about 
a body growing inside the soul (like a stone that grows at the root of a tree—speci-
fies Rowe), I believe that the term σύμφυτον is ontologically stronger than Rowe is 
actually prepared to admit. The fascinating idea hidden in the term is the one of a 
body that grows along with the soul.
My correction, not by chance, follows a lectio facilior in translating σύμφυτον. 
Rowe’s elegant solution is that the term refers to the process, but I believe it has 
more to do with the result of the growing together. So, there would be in the term 
σύμφυτον, more precisely, the indication of a connaturality between body and soul. 
A good example of the use of the term can be found in Aristotle’s Topics, where he 
says: “ἡ ἀλγηδὼν διάστασις τῶν συμφύτων μερῶν μετὰ βίας,” pain is the violent 
interruption of naturally attached parts (Arist. Top 145b2-3). The term συμφύτων 
means here precisely the union of parts to such a natural point that a separation 
could only be violent (and, consequently, generates pain).
The coupling of body and soul, so, does not appear to be accidental, like it would 
be in the case of a stone growing inside the root of a tree, as Rowe suggested. On the 
contrary, it is like the two parts naturally joined in the aforementioned definition of 
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pain from Aristotle’s Topics. Like two brothers or sisters, for instance, who grew up 
together and whose violent separation can only cause pain.
The vocabulary of this communion and connaturality between the body and the 
soul seems to put in serious trouble, therefore, any interpretation of the argument 
from affinity which wants to look at the argument exclusively from the point of view 
of the soul having affinity with the invisible and unchangeable. What is described 
here, rather, is the struggle of the soul in its double (chameleonic) nature: grown 
along with the body but aspiring to the company of invisible gods (81a10). For, as 
we said, in this case there would be, within the scholarship, an unjustified emphasis 
on an ontological dualism which will be stronger than the one emerging from these 
pages. The soul, in the argument from affinity, is not incorruptible as the forms are, 
because its ontological status would not allow it, due to its inescapable physical 
traits.
Consequently, instead of being a strong ontological premise, the separation of 
body and soul could be understood as something to be conquered with violence and 
pain, to refer ourselves once again to the image quoted above from Aristotle’s 
Topics.
The ontological dualism seems to depend on a permanent effort of the individual, 
both epistemological and ethical.11 What I’m willing to claim here is that the very 
ontological resistance of the body-soul dualism relies on the effort of the individual 
to keep the two separated.
Thus, a moral separation precedes the ontological one, not the other way round, 
as we have been usually taught to believe. The Platonic dualistic ontology seems to 
want to rely on the search for truth and happiness (81a 6-7) of a soul chameleon in 
its wandering through the sensible world, along with the body with which it grew up 
and developed.
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